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Abstract
The European Union provides coordination and nancing of trans-European trans-
port infrastructures, i.e. roads and railways, which link the EU Member States
and reduce the cost of transport and mobility. This raises the question of whether
EU involvement in this area is justied by ine¢ ciencies of national infrastructure
policies. Moreover, an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobil-
ity may boost tax competition. We analyse these questions using a model where
countries compete for the location of protable rms. We show that a coordina-
tion of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries
enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition. In contrast, with regard to union-
periphery infrastructure, the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of
investment expenditures. Here, the e¤ects on tax competition are ambiguous. Our
results provide a rationale for EU-level regional policy that supports the develop-
ment of intra-union infrastructure.
JEL Codes: H54, H25, F23
Keywords: European Union, Infrastructure, Regional Policy, Tax Competition
I
1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) invests substantial resources in transport infrastruc-
tures, i.e. in roads and railways which link the EU member countries to each other.
The intended e¤ect is to reduce mobility costs of workers and transport costs for
goods and factors of production. This reduction of mobility costs is in line with
the objective of fostering economic integration in the Common Market. However,
from an economic perspective, these policies also raise various concerns. Firstly,
the question arises whether EU involvement is necessary, given that member states
themselves also have an interest in improving their infrastructure. Secondly, in-
creasing mobility across borders has implications for other policy areas as well, in
particular tax policy. As some member states are concerned about tax competi-
tion, the question of how EU infrastructure policies a¤ect tax competition may be
of crucial importance.1 A widespread view is that increased international mobility
leads to more intensive tax competition.
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between regional policies, i.e. public
investment in regional infrastructure, and tax competition. We develop a model
of open economies competing for foreign direct investment through tax and infra-
structure policies. Infrastructure investment leads to the reduction of transport
costs of goods across borders. We assume that some countries form a union and
are able to coordinate their infrastructure policies but not their tax policies. This
reects the current situation within the European Union, where large infrastruc-
ture policies are (co-)nanced by the supranational EU-level, while business taxes
remain uncoordinated. We ask whether national infrastructure policies are e¢ cient
for the union as a whole and how coordination of infrastructure policies a¤ects tax
competition, given that the member states retain autonomy in corporate taxation.
Our results show that national governments will invest in infrastructure in or-
der to attract rms and to reduce import prices faced by domestic consumers.
However, uncoordinated national infrastructure policies do not lead to e¢ cient
1For instance, on a visit in Poland after its accession to the EU, on May 26th 2004, the
German chancellor Gerhard Schröder argued, with reference to EU regional policies: It is
certainly unreasonable that we nance an unbridled tax competition among each other via the
EU budget, cited after Jan Stoyaspal: Want Lower Taxes? Go East, TIME Magazine of 11th
July 2004.
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outcomes for the union as a whole. There is a potential for welfare enhancing
coordination of infrastructure policies. These welfare gains arise not only be-
cause national infrastructure investment gives rise to spillovers, but also because
more infrastructure investment may mitigate tax competition. This is surpris-
ing because policies which enhance mobility are usually considered as intensifying
tax competition. In our model, this is not the case because more infrastructure
reduces transport costs and thus reduces the di¤erence between the prices of im-
ported compared to domestically produced goods faced by consumers. Attracting
rms to make them produce close to the consumers becomes less important, so
that governments are less willing to cut taxes. We also consider investment in
infrastructure which reduces the transport costs to non-union countries. In this
case, uncoordinated expenditures are too high from the perspective of the union,
and the e¤ect of infrastructure spending on tax competition within the union is
ambiguous.
In the empirical literature on international taxation, the idea that decreasing
mobility costs intensies tax competition is taken for granted.2 Tax competition
is predicted to be strongest between neighboring countries. Indeed, proximity is a
strong determinant for the location of investment by multinational investors, see
e.g. Markusen (2002) or Buch (2005). In contrast, the literature dealing with tax
competition between countries is somewhat inconclusive. There are only very few
papers which set out to measure tax competition directly and, more specically,
there is no unanimous approach towards geographical distance. Whereas Devereux
et al. (2008) do not account for the impact of distance and nd signicant evidence
for tax competition, Overesch & Rincke (2008) show that the evidence becomes
weak when distance is omitted from the regression equation.3
Apart from this, our paper is related to several distinct strands of literature.
Firstly, there is a theoretical literature dealing with the regional policies of central
governments in federal systems. Fuest & Huber (2006) analyze regional policy
from a public nance point of view. They argue that a coordination of regional
policies helps internalizing positive externalities of national policies. However, in
their model, regional policies do not a¤ect transport costs. Ulltveit-Moe (2007)
2See the surveys by Devereux (2007) and Hines (1999).
3Further evidence for tax competition is provided in Winner (2005) and Lahrèche-Révil (2006).
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explores whether redistributive goals can be achieved by more e¢ cient instruments
than those used by the EU. Behrens et al. (2007) analyse transport-cost reducing
regional policies in a new economic geographymodel. Their focus is on intra-
versus interregional agglomeration, though.
Secondly, there is a literature on intergovernmental competition over public
spending on infrastructure, see in particular Keen & Marchand (1997). They
consider a model where the government provides infrastructure and a public con-
sumption good and show that there is too much infrastructure spending in the
uncoordinated equilibrium. Thirdly, several papers analyse partial coordination in
the sense that policy coordination agreements cover only a subset of the available
policy instruments. This literature shows that partial coordination agreements
may fail to be e¤ective because governments react by adjusting other instruments,
see Fuest (1995) and Cremer & Gahvari (2000). Fourthly, there is a literature
which analyzes interjurisdictional competition for protable rms.4 These contri-
butions assume that a potential reason why it may be desirable for a country to
attract investment is the existence of transport costs. If production takes place
close to consumers, consumer prices are lower compared to the case where goods
have to imported. Seen from the rms perspective, it is desirable to locate where
consumers are in order to charge higher prices net of transport costs.5 A nal re-
lated strand of literature analyzes the e¤ects of policy coordination in a subset of
competing countries.6 Basically, these papers show that policy coordination may
yield welfare gains even if only a subset of countries participates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a quick
overview on infrastructure expenditures of the European Union. In section 3, the
model is presented. Sections 4 and 5 analyze competition and coordination of tax
policies and regional infrastructure expenditures. Section 6 concludes.
4See e.g. Black & Hoyt (1989), Haaparanta (1996), Hauer & Wooton (1999, 2006) and Fuest
(2005).
5In so far, this literature builds on the New Trade Theory or New Economic Geography, see
Baldwin & Krugman (2004).
6Apart from Hauer and Wooton (2006), who analyze the coordination of tax or subsidy
policies within a union of countries, important contributions to this literature are Konrad &
Schjelderup (1999) and Sørensen (2004).
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2 Infrastructure expenditure and tax competi-
tion within the European Union
According to the EU, transport infrastructure investments contribute to achiev-
ing sustainable growth, which is one of the core objectives of EU policies. The
Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion by the European Commission
(2007a) states: An e¢ cient transport system is a key factor underlying regional
competitiveness and growth. Accordingly, it is one of the main areas of investment
of cohesion policy.(p. 100) In the 2008 budget of the European Union, 44,9% of
total expenditures are spent for this purpose. This budget share corresponds to 58
billion e of which 46,9 billion e are planned for cohesion policies and 11,1 billion
e for the purpose of supporting competitiveness.
Since the actual level of transport infrastructure expenditures depends on the
projects the member states apply for, it is helpful to take a look at the pattern of
expenditures in the past. Financing is mainly provided via the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion
Fund (CF). From 2000 to 2006, the ERDF and the ESF jointly spent 24,9 billion
e for transport infrastructures. This corresponds to 19,2 per cent of the total
funds budget. In the same period, the Cohesion Fund (CF) invested 16,8 billion
e into transport facilities which equals 48,8% of total funds.7 Figure 1 illustrates
the nancing of transport infrastructure.
Although infrastructure expenditures by ERDF, ESF and CF are mainly tar-
geted at regions which lag behind in terms of growth, employment and productiv-
ity, the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) are supported in virtually
all member states and regions. From the perspective of this paper, they play
a special role. These transport networks include motorways, railways, airports,
and ports as well as tra¢ c management and navigation systems (e.g. satellite pro-
grams). In its decision 884/2004/EC8, the European Parliament and the European
Council name thirty priority projects which are part of the TEN-T. The selection
is based on the following analysis: Growth in tra¢ c, in particular due to the
growing share of heavy goods vehicles, has resulted in increased congestion and
7All data are taken from European Commission (2007b).
8http://ec.europa.eu/ten/transport/legislation/doc/2004_0884_en.pdf
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bottlenecks on international transport corridors. In order to ensure international
mobility of goods and passengers, it is therefore necessary to optimise the capacity
of the trans-European transport network. (p. 1).
EU budget:
580 billion €
ESF / ERDF
129.8 billion €
Cohesion Fund
34.6 billion €
Transport
infrastructure
expenditures
TEN-T
24.9 billion €
16.8 billion €
Figure 1: Financing transport infrastructures (2000-2006).
According to a memo of the European Commission (2003), [by] 2020 the total
cost of the trans-European network [...] will amount to e 600 billion (p. 8),
20% of which are to be nanced by the private sector and up to 30% by the
European Union. These gures show that transport infrastructure is e¤ectively a
core objective of EU policies.
Four questions arise, though. Firstly, one may ask whether these policies
achieve their goals. Based on a simulation study which predicts growth e¤ects
of infrastructure on productivity and welfare until 2031, the Commission memo
optimistically claims that investments in transport infrastructures should improve
welfare which may lead to a boost in economic growth of 0.23% of GDP (p. 8).
However, the Cohesion report says that [since] the gains in terms of GDP growth
and accessibility tend to be relatively evenly spread across regions, the contribution
to reducing regional disparities is often modest.(p. 102)9 And: The e¤ect, how-
ever, tends to be larger in smaller countries, especially if the investment serves to
improve connections to the economic core of Europe.(p. 102)
Secondly, the question arises why the European Union should implement these
policies and not the member states themselves. The Commission states that there
is a case for European involvement in spending. Indeed, many of the projects
would not be economic if considered purely in terms of the returns to the Member
State commissioning them but have a high return to the EU as a whole.(p. 102)
9This would explain why the evidence reported in some studies discussed in Boldrin & Canova
(2001) is rather pessimistic about the e¤ects of regional policy on convergence.
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In other words, the Commission seems to believe in positive external e¤ects of
infrastructure investments leading to underinvestment if national policies are un-
coordinated. If this view is correct, a coordination of infrastructure policies on the
EU-level policy is welfare-enhancing because it accounts for these externalities, an
argument derived in Fuest & Huber (2006).
Thirdly, critics may argue that some of the implemented policies are not precise
in their e¤ects. For example, many of the priority projects enlisted in the frame-
work of the TEN-T policy do not aim at connecting the European periphery to the
core, but strengthen the ties between core countries. This may e¤ectively reinforce
the core countriesadvantage in accessibility and growth potential. A closer look
at the project list shows that, indeed, many of the projects are realized in countries
which are not target regions of the cohesion policies. E.g. project no. 1 is a rail
axis between Berlin, Munich and Milano, i.e. cities which are certainly not loc-
ated in peripheral regions. Project no. 2 is a rail axis between Paris and London
with links to Brussels and Cologne. For the whole list, see European Commission
(2005). Thus, the EU seems to believe in the benecial e¤ect of infrastructure not
only in the case where the periphery is connected to the core.
Fourthly, as discussed above, it is an often expressed concern that increas-
ing mobility undermines the national governments ability to levy tax revenue
necessary to fund the provision of public goods. Thus, a potential consequence
of transport cost cutting infrastructure investment may be that tax competition
among countries within the EU is ercer than competition between countries from
distinct regions.
To sum up, the EU claims that infrastructure policies are benecial and that
there is a need for coordinating such policies. The actual policy implementation
seems to suggest that there is not only a benet from infrastructure linking the
periphery to the core but also from infrastructure between di¤erent core regions.
Fiercer tax competition may be an undesirable by-product of these investments.
In the next section, we present a model which allows to study these issues.
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3 The model
Consider a region with three countries called A, B and C. Countries A and B
form a union. This means that a supranational government exists which is able
to coordinate national infrastructure policies. There are investor rms from the
rest of the world who consider setting up factories in the region to serve the
three markets in the three countries. We assume that only countries A and B
are considered as investment locations, either because C is too small or because
production costs in country C are too high. We also assume that C is passive, i.e.
its infrastructure expenditure is given and does not adjust in response to tax or
infrastructure changes in countries A and B. This implies a focus on intra-union
tax and infrastructure competition. Country C only plays the role of a market
for goods produced by rms locating in the union. In section 5, we modify this
setting and consider competition for rms between C and a union country (A).
3.1 Households
Consumers in all countries are identical. Their number is nA = 1 in country A,
nB in country B and nC in country C. The representative household consumes a
numeraire good denoted by z and a continuum of other di¤erentiated goods x (s),
where s is an index of di¤erentiation which is uniformly distributed between 0
and 1, with density  (s) and a distribution function 	(s). The household has
quadratic, quasi-linear preferences:
ui =
Z 1
0

xi (s)  1
2
xi (s)
2

 (s) ds+ zi for i 2 fA;B;Cg (1)
where  and  are preference parameters. Each household inelastically supplies
one unit of labor, and the wage rate is given by wi. The representative households
budget constraint in country i is
wi +
Ti
ni
= zi +
Z 1
0
pi (s)xi (s)  (s) ds: (2)
Product prices in country i are unity for good zi and pi (s) for good xi (s).
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Ti=ni is a per-capita transfer from the government (or a tax if Ti is negative). The
rms producing the di¤erentiated good are owned by households residing outside
the region. Replacing zi in (1) yields
ui =
Z 1
0

  1
2
xi (s)  pi (s)

xi (s)  (s) ds+ wi +
Ti
ni
(3)
Utility maximizing choice of xi (s), denoted by x^i (s) implies
x^i (s) =
  pi (s)

8s (4)
and aggregate demand in country i is given by
nix^i (s) = ni

  pi (s)


: (5)
3.2 Firms
The numeraire good z is produced by perfectly competitive rms using a linear
production technology where labour is the only input. z is freely traded with
negligible trade costs, so that wage costs are equalised across countries.10
The goods x (s) are produced under imperfect competition and increasing re-
turns to scale. Each variety s is produced by a monopolist rm. There is no entry
or exit of rms, so that the number of rms is xed. The production technology
in the x (s)-sector is characterized by xed costs F and constant marginal costs
denoted by c. Due to the existence of prohibitive xed costs for a second plant,
each rm considers investment in just one of the three countries. The xed costs
F di¤er across rms and locations.11 The xed cost for all rms locating in coun-
try A is normalized to FA. The xed cost in country B is equal to FA + (s),
where (s) denotes the location-specic xed cost disadvantage (or advantage in
case of negative values of (s)) of country B, which di¤ers across varieties (and,
hence, rms) s. We assume that s can be continuously mapped to (s) with
10Thus, rm location has no impact on wages.
11For an analysis of tax competition in a similar setting with heterogeneity in xed costs and
free entry see Davies & Eckel (2007).
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(0) =  , (1) = + and @=@s = , where  is a positive parameter.12 The
goods x (s) can be shipped across borders, but there is a transport cost k between
each pair of countries. The transport cost between countries i and j is denoted
by kij. Transport costs within countries are assumed to be zero (kii = 0). Thus,
each rm in the x (s)-sector consists of a production plant in one country and two
export platforms (like in Ekholm et al., 2007) in the two other countries.
3.3 National governments and the union
In each union country, a benevolent government maximizes the utility of the rep-
resentative household. There are two policy instruments. Firstly, there is a tax
(or subsidy) per rm denoted by ti. Considering a tax per rm, rather than a
proportional prot tax is common in the literature, see e.g. Hauer & Wooton
(1999, 2006), and makes the analysis more tractable but implies that our model
abstracts from several aspects of real world tax systems.13 The results of the
following analysis have to be interpreted in the light of these limitations.
The second policy instrument is infrastructure investment iji . Investment in
infrastructure reduces trade costs kij. We assume kij = kij
 
iji ; 
ij
j

with ki < 0,
kii > 0. For simplicity, we assume that kij = 0. This implies that infrastruc-
ture expenditure can be targeted towards trade with particular countries. The
underlying idea is that a country may, for instance, improve roads and railway
links to one country and neglect the links to another country.
The public sector budget constraint is given by
Ti = timi  
X
j
iji (6)
where mi is the number of rms located in country i and 
ij
i is country is
expenditure on infrastructure between i and j.
12In order to make sure that an interior equilibrium exists, we assume   < 0.
13Firstly, governments may want to use tax policy to change the quantities of rms operating
in imperfectly competitive markets. Accordingly, it may be optimal to subsidize inputs and tax
the resulting monopolistic prots via a proportional prot tax. A tax per rm does not allow
them to do so. Secondly, a tax per rm assumes away some complexities of the interaction
between location decisions of rms, tax changes and public infrastructure investment, as we will
explain further below.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the model.
Figure 2 summarizes and illustrates the model. The rms decide between the
two locations A and B and take into account the market access via exports to the
other union country and country C.
3.4 Equilibrium
The timing of decisions is as follows: At the rst stage, countries simultaneously
set i and tax rates. At the second stage, the rms choose their location. At
stage three, they choose their quantities. As usual, we derive the equilibrium by
backward induction, beginning with stage three. At this stage, the location of the
rms is given, and the rms set their quantities to maximize prots. Let ij be
the prots in country i if the rm locates in j. Then overall prots before taxes
and rm specic xed costs are given by
j =
X
i
ij =
X
i
(pij   cij)nixij (7)
Using (4), the prot-maximizing quantities imply
nixij = ni
  cij
2
(8)
and equilibrium prices are pij =
+cij
2
. Marginal costs are cij = w + kij with
kii = 0 and kij = kji.
Next, consider stage 2, where the rm chooses its location. If the rm locates
10
in country A, its prots are
A =
1
4
(  w)2 + nB
4
(  w   kAB)2 + nC
4
(  w   kAC)2   FA   tA (9)
Note that, in country A, all sectors s have the same after-tax prots.14 In
contrast, due to sector-specic location costs, prots in case of location inB depend
on s and are given by
B (s) =
1
4
(  w   kBA)2+ nB
4
(  w)2+ nC
4
(  w   kBC)2 FA (s) tB
(10)
The heterogeneity in location-specic xed costs gives rise to an equilbrium
where each of the two countries hosts some rms.15 If we assume that rms
weakly prefer country A, rms will locate in this country if A  B. Let s
denote the sector which is just indi¤erent between the two production locations,
i.e. A = B, and   (s) the corresponding xed cost di¤erence. Firms
with a xed cost di¤erence above  will prefer country A over country B, and
vice versa, where  is given by
 =
nB   1
4

2kAB (  w)  k2AB

+(kAC   kBC) nC
4
[2 (  w)  (kAC + kBC)]+tA tB
(11)
Note that if both countries are of equal size, nB = 1, and if the transport costs
from the two countries to country C are identical, kAC = kBC , then the marginal
di¤erence in xed costs is equal to the di¤erence in taxes:  = tA   tB.16
Figure 3 illustrates the rm allocation across countries. Firm varieties are
indexed by s 2 [0; 1] where rms with a low index have low xed costs of locating
in B and vice versa. The rm with the index s is just indi¤erent between the two
locations, see (11), which implies that all rms above s locate in country A and
14Since we do not allow rms to enter and exit the market, we have to assume that the
non-negativity condition for prots A  0 always holds, which is satised if FA is su¢ ciently
low.
15The existence of such an interior solution requires   to be su¢ ciently small and + to be
su¢ ciently large.
16Note that this relationship, as well as the impact of taxes and infrastructure changes on
location decisions, would be more complex and depend on the level of infrastructure expenditure
if a proportional prot tax was considered, rather than a unit tax per rm.
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all rms beneath s in country B. Policy measures which increase  decrease
the number of rms in country A. The size of this e¤ect depends crucially on
the parameter  which can be interpreted as a determinant of rm mobility. An
increase of  by one unit translates into rm relocation ds of 1=. The lower ,
the larger the elasticity of rm relocation with respect to policy changes.
g
*D
-D
+D
0
s
1*s
Firms in
country A
slope:
Firms in
country B
Figure 3: Allocation of rms across countries.
Equation (11) implicitly denes a function = (tA; tB; 
AB
A ; 
AB
B ; 
AC
A ; 
BC
B ).
Not surprisingly, an increase in the tax di¤erential tA   tB induces more rms to
locate in B: @

@tA
= 1 =  @
@tB
. More infrastructure between countries A and B will
induce more rms to locate in B if country B is smaller than A (and vice versa):
@
@ABi
= (nB   1) (  w   kAB)
2
@kAB
@ABi
i = A;B (12)
This happens for the following reason. Assume for the sake of the argument
that taxes and transport costs to C are the same in countries A and B. Since
country B o¤ers a smaller local market for consumer goods (nB < 1), it is only
attractive as a location for rms if it o¤ers a cost advantage, i.e.  < 0.17 This
cost advantage compensates rms for the transport cost of exporting to the larger
market of country A. Note that rms located in A also have to bear transport
17The role of country size asymmetries for intergovernmental competition is also explored in
Kanbur & Keen (1993), who consider a model where consumers engage in cross border shopping.
In their model, the small country levies lower taxes because, due to the smaller tax base, the
cost of undercutting the other country is lower than for the large country.
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costs for selling in B. But the quantities of the di¤erentiated good exported from
A to B are smaller than the quantities exported from B to A, so that transport
costs are less important for rms located in A. If infrastructure between A and B
is improved, this transport cost disadvantage becomes smaller, but the xed cost
advantage does not change. As a result, more rms will locate in country B.
Expenditure on infrastructure between A and C will attract more rms to A
because better access to country C consumers increases prots:
@
@ACA
= nC
(  w   kAC)
2
@kAC
@ACA
< 0 (13)
For the same reason, an improved infrastructure between B and C will attract
more rms to country B:
@
@BCB
=  nC (  w   kBC)
2
@kBC
@BCB
> 0 (14)
In the next section, we analyze tax and infrastructure competition between
countries A and B.
4 Tax and infrastructure competition
Governments of both union countries set their tax policy to maximize the utility
of the representative citizen while taking the tax policy of the other country as
given. The objective function of the government of country A can be written as:
uA =
Z 1
s
(  w)2
8
 (s) ds+
Z s
0
(  w   kAB)2
8
 (s) ds+wA+
Z 1
s
tA (s) ds 
X
k
kA
(15)
The rst term on the right hand side (r.h.s.) is the consumer surplus from
all goods produced in country A, the second term represents the surplus from
consumption of goods imported from country B. This surplus is a function of
the transport cost kAB. The fourth term is tax revenue from all rms located in
country A, net of infrastructure expenditure.
Equivalently, the representative households utility level in country B is equal
13
to
uB =
Z 1
s
(  w   kAB)2
8
 (s) ds+
Z s
0
(  w)2
8
 (s) ds+wB+
Z s
0
tB
nB
 (s) ds 
X
k
kB
nB
(16)
Note that a variation of s a¤ects both countries di¤erently:
@uA
@s
=  
 
  w   kAB
2
4
kAB + tA
!
 (s) < 0 (17)
@uB
@s
=
 
  w   kAB
2
4
kAB +
tB
nB
!
 (s) > 0 (18)
A marginal increase in s (which corresponds to the relocation of the marginal
rm from A to B) a¤ects consumer surplus negatively in A and positively in B,
and it reduces tax revenue in A and increases it in B.
4.1 Optimal tax and intra-union infrastructure policies
What are the forces driving tax policy in this model? The rst order condition for
the optimal tax rate of country A is given by
@uA
@tA
=
Z 1
s
 (s) ds+
@uA
@s
1

= 0 (19)
where we use @s=@tA = 1=. The rst term on the r.h.s. is the gain in tax
revenue for a given tax base, the second term represents the cost of rm relocation
to country B. Accordingly, the rst order condition for the optimal tax rate of
country B is given by
@uB
@tB
=
1
nB
Z s
0
 (s) ds  @uB
@s
1

= 0 (20)
where we use @s=@tB =  1=.
The rst order condition for the optimal infrastructure expenditure of country
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A, ABA , is given by
@uA
@ABA
=  1 
Z s
0
(  w   kAB)
4
@kAB
@ABA
 (s) ds+
@uA
@s
@s
@ABA
= 0 (21)
The rst term on the r.h.s. is the pecuniary cost of infrastructure expenditure.
The second term is the gain due to lower transport costs which translates into
lower consumer prices of products imported from B. The third term captures the
rm relocation e¤ect caused by a change in infrastructure expenditure. It is equal
to zero if countries A and B are of equal size, see equation (12). The rst order
condition for the optimal investment of country B is
@uB
@ABB
=   1
nB
 
Z 1
s
(  w   kAB)
4
@kAB
@ABB
 (s) ds+
@uB
@s
@s
@ABB
= 0 (22)
which can be interpreted similarly.18
4.2 Tax and infrastructure policy coordination
Our main focus is to investigate whether there is scope for welfare enhancing
policy coordination and how tax and infrastructure policies interact. We begin by
considering tax and infrastructure coordination separately. Consider the following
experiment: departing from the equilibrium without coordination, countries A and
B simultaneously increase their taxes by a small amount dtA = dtB = dt, holding
all other policy variables constant. The impact of this coordinated tax change on
country A is given by
duA =
@uA
@tA
dtA +
@uA
@tB
dtB (23)
Since @uA
@tA
= 0 holds in the uncoordinated equilibrium, we can express the
welfare e¤ect as
duA
dt
=
@uA
@tB
=  @uA
@s
1

> 0 (24)
18For the second order conditions to hold, the transport cost functions must be su¢ ciently
convex in ABA and 
AB
B . A derivation of the second order conditions is available from the
authors on request.
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In the same way, we can derive the e¤ect on the welfare of country B as:
duB
dt
=
@uB
@tA
=
@uB
@s
1

> 0 (25)
Tax competition leads to tax rates which are too low from the perspective of
the union as a whole. The reason is that the tax increase of one country gives rise
to a positive scal externality, i.e. it increases the welfare of the other country,
because the tax increase induces some rms to locate in the other country. The
other country benets from this through, rstly, higher tax revenue and, secondly,
lower consumer prices. This implies that tax competition in this model is indeed
harmful in that it leads to a race to the bottom.
Consider next a coordination of intra-union infrastructure expenditure by dABA =
dABB = d
AB, assuming that all other policy instruments including tax rates are
held constant. The welfare e¤ect is now given by
duA
dAB
=
@uA
@ABB
=  
Z s
0
(  w   kAB)
4
@kAB
@ABB
 (s) ds+
@uA
@s
@s
@ABB
(26)
Using equation (21) and @kAB
@ABB
= @kAB
@ABA
, this can be reduced to duA
dAB
= 1. For
country B, it is straightforward to show that duB
dAB
= 1
nB
. Uncoordinated infra-
structure expenditure is ine¢ ciently low because national governments neglect that
foreign consumers benet from an improvement of the infrastructure between the
two countries. These ndings may be summarized as
Proposition 1 i) Departing from the uncoordinated equilibrium and holding con-
stant all other policy instruments, a coordinated increase in corporate taxes in-
creases the welfare of all member states of the union. ii) Departing from the
uncoordinated equilibrium and holding constant all other policy instruments, a co-
ordinated increase in intra-union infrastructure expenditure increases the welfare
of all member states of the union.
The results in proposition 1 have been derived under the assumption that
coordination in one policy eld does not a¤ect the way in which policies are set
in other elds. However, as discussed in the introduction, there are concerns
that policy coordination in the eld of infrastructure provision may a¤ect policies
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pursued by countries in the eld of tax policy, where they are not bound by
coordination agreements. We therefore consider the following policy experiment:
There is a coordinated change in infrastructure expenditure by dABA = d
AB
B =
dAB, but national governments may react to this coordination by adjusting their
tax policies as they like. The e¤ect of infrastructure coordination on the welfare
of the representative household residing in country A is now given by
duA =
@uA
@ABA
dABA +
@uA
@ABB
dABB +
@uA
@tA
dtA +
@uA
@tB
dtB (27)
Since @uA
@ABA
= @uA
@tA
= 0 holds in the uncoordinated equilibrium, we can rewrite
the above equation as:
duA
dAB
=
@uA
@ABB
+
@uA
@tB
dtB
dAB
(28)
Total di¤erentiation of (19) and (20) yields
dtA
dAB
=  nB  w   kAB
2
@kAB
@AB
> 0 (29)
dtB
dAB
=    w   kAB
2
@kAB
@AB
> 0 (30)
The coordinated increase in AB raises equilibrium tax rates. Thus, we can
rewrite equation (28) as
duA
dAB
=  
Z s
0
 (s) ds  2nB

@uA
@s

  w   kAB
4
@kAB
@AB
> 0 (31)
The equivalent expression for country B is given by
duB
dAB
=  
Z 1
s
 (s) ds+ 2
1

@uB
@s

  w   kAB
4
@kAB
@AB
> 0 (32)
We may thus state
Proposition 2 A coordinated increase in intra-union infrastructure expenditure,
departing from the uncoordinated equilibrium, mitigates tax competition and un-
ambiguously increases welfare.
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The result in proposition 2 is surprising because the increase in infrastructure
spending increases the mobility of goods between countries A and B, and higher
mobility is usually thought to intensify tax competition. But here it turns out that
taxes increase. This can be explained as follows: One reason to cut taxes in this
model is that attracting production plants reduces consumer prices in the country.
However, this benet declines if the infrastructure improves and transport costs
are smaller. Therefore countries increase taxes when the transport infrastructure
is improved.
The model which leads to proposition 2 assumes that, in the absence of policy
coordination, taxes and infrastructure expenditures are set simultaneously. An
alternative setup would be a sequential approach as in King et al. (1993), where
countries commit to infrastructure expenditure rst and then set taxes at stage 2.
It is straighforward to show that the key results of our analysis would also hold in
this case. At stage 1, governments would take into account that an increase in their
infrastructure expenditure would lead to higher taxes in the tax competition sub-
game at stage 2. But, acting individually, they would neglect i) the direct benet
of their infrastructure investment on the foriegn country and ii) the positive im-
pact of their own higher domestic tax on the foreign country. Therefore, departing
from an equilibrium without coordination, a coordinated increase in infrastructure
expenditures at stage 1 would again increase taxes and union welfare.19
4.3 Optimal union-periphery infrastructure policies
Now, consider the expenditures for infrastructure which links the union countries
A and B to the peripheral country C. Optimal infrastructure expenditures ACA
are given by
@uA
@ACA
=  1 + @uA
@s
nC

  w   kAC
2
@kAC
@ACA
= 0 (33)
Equivalently, optimal infrastructure expenditures BCB are given by
@uB
@BCB
=   1
nB
  @uB
@s
nC

  w   kBC
2
@kBC
@BCB
= 0 (34)
19A derivation of these e¤ects is available from the authors on request.
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Again, we start by considering the e¤ect of a coordinated increase in infra-
structure expenditure, holding all other policy variables constant. With @uA
@ACA
= 0
and dACA = d
BC
B = d
C , the welfare change for country A is determined by the
derivative
duA
dC
=
@uA
@BCB
=  @uA
@s
nC

  w   kBC
2
@kBC
@BCB
< 0: (35)
This implies that a coordinated increase in infrastructure expenditures towards
country C reduces the welfare of country A. The same result can be derived for
B. There is overspending on infrastructure because an individual country does
not take into account that spending more on infrastructure to country C attracts
rms from the other member country and thus negatively a¤ects this country, as
does a tax cut.
Proposition 3 Departing from the uncoordinated equilibrium and holding con-
stant all other policy instruments, a coordinated reduction of expenditures in infra-
structure which links the union with the periphery increases union welfare (fortress
building).
Taking into account an adjustment of tax rates, the overall welfare change can
be expressed as
duA
dC
=
@uA
@BCB
+
@uA
@tB
dtB
dC
(36)
Following the same procedure as before, we can derive
dtA
dC
=  nC (  w   kAC)
6
@kAC
@ACA
+ nC
(  w   kBC)
6
@kBC
@BCB
(37)
dtB
dC
= nC
(  w   kAC)
6
@kAC
@ACA
  nC (  w   kBC)
6
@kBC
@BCB
(38)
These results imply that, departing from an asymmetric equilibrium, a coordin-
ated increase on union-periphery infrastructure spending has an ambiguous e¤ect
on tax levels. This can be explained as follows. Assume, for instance, that the
coordinated higher infrastructure spending strongly reduces the transport costs
between A and C whereas the impact on the transport cost between B and C
is negligible (i.e. @kBC
@BCB
is close to zero). In this case, country A would attract
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more rms because the access to country C it o¤ers improves relative to the ac-
cess o¤ered by country B. As a result, it would increase its tax whereas B would
reduce it. In contrast, if A and B are symmetric, a simultaneous variation in ACA
and BCB has no impact on the equilibrium tax levels.
How does the increase in infrastructure expenditure a¤ect welfare? Equation
(36) can be rewritten as
duA
dC
=  @uA
@s
nC


  w   kAC
6
@kAC
@ACA
+
  w   kBC
3
@kBC
@BCB

< 0 (39)
Note that, if A and B are symmetric, this equation boils down to the expression
in (35). Equivalently, we can derive the welfare e¤ect for country B:
duB
dC
=
@uB
@s
nC


  w   kAC
3
@kAC
@ACA
+
(  w   kBC)
6
@kBC
@BCB

< 0 (40)
We summarize this in
Proposition 4 Departing from the uncoordinated equilibrium and taking into ac-
count decentralized tax policy adjustments, a coordinated increase of expenditures
in infrastructure which links the union with the periphery unambiguously decreases
welfare. Its e¤ect on equilibrium tax rates is ambiguous.
The result that, from the perspective of the union, there is too much spending
on infrastructure which links the union countries to the periphery can be explained
as follows. Acting individually, union countries neglect that more infrastructure
spending will attract rms from the other union country. This reduces tax revenue
and consumer surplus in that country. If countries are asymmetric, the coordinated
change in infrastructure will lead to tax changes, but as equations (39) and (40)
show, these adjustment will not change the sign of the welfare e¤ect.
So far, we have assumed that competition takes place between the two union
countries. We now turn to the analysis of competition between a union country
and the non-union country C.
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5 Tax and infrastructure competition between
union and non-union countries
The analysis in the preceding section shows that transport-cost reducing invest-
ment in infrastructure may mitigate tax competition within the union. However,
competition for foreign direct investment may also occur between union countries
and non-union countries. In this section, we explore if accounting for competition
between union and non-union countries changes our results. Therefore, we now
assume that country A and the non-union country C compete for rms. This is
the case if, for all s, the location-specic prots are higher in either of the two
countries than in country B, which may be due to high transport costs, a low
number of inhabitants or low location-specic cost disadvantages . The results
apply, however, equally for competition between B and C.
Therefore, replace (10) by
C (s) =
1
4
(  w   kAC)2+nB
4
(  w   kBC)2+nC
4
(  w)2 FA C (s) tA
(41)
where C is the additional xed cost in country C, and (11) by
C =
nC   1
4

2kAC (  w)  k2AC

+(kAB   kBC) nB
4
[2 (  w)  (kAB + kBC)]+tA tC
(42)
Thus, an individual rm prefers A to C if A > C or if C > C .
The utility of the representative household in country A is given by
uA =
Z 1
s
(  w)2
8
 (s) ds+
Z s
0
(  w   kAC)2
8
 (s) ds+wA+
Z 1
s
tA (s) ds 
X
k
kA
(43)
The only change compared to the case considered in the preceding section is
that consumer surplus is now reduced by the transport costs kAC instead of kAB.
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The representative households utility level in country B is equal to
uB =
Z 1
s
(  w   kAB)2
8
 (s) ds+
Z s
0
(  w   kBC)2
8
 (s) ds+ wB  
X
k
kB
nB
(44)
Households in country B are indi¤erent between importing goods from A and
C as long as the transport costs kAB and kBC are equal. This can be illustrated
by considering a marginal increase in s:
@uB
@s
=
  w   kAB+kBC
2
4
(kAB   kBC)  (s) (45)
CountryA prots from a relocation of the marginal rm fromA toC (increasing
s) if the transport cost from C is lower than from country A.
Finally, consider the the representative household in country C whose utility
is given by
uC =
Z 1
s
(  w   kAC)2
8
 (s) ds+
Z s
0
(  w)2
8
 (s) ds+ wC +
Z s
0
tC
nC
 (s) ds
(46)
In the uncoordinated equilibrium, countriesA and C will set tax rates according
to @uA
@tA
= 0 and @uC
@tC
= 0, and the union countries will determine their infrastructure
expenditures according to @uA
@ABA
= 0 and @uB
@ABB
= 0. It is straightforward to show
that duA
dAB
= @uA
@ABB
= 1 and duB
dAB
= @uB
@ABA
= 1
nB
, if tax rates are held constant. This
implies that coordination in intra-union infrastructure has unambiguously positive
welfare e¤ects. What is the welfare e¤ect of a coordinated increase in ABA and
ABB if tax rates in countries A and C are allowed to adjust?
Consider rstly country A. The e¤ect of a coordinated increase in ABA and
ABB on its welfare is given by
duA
dAB
=
@uA
@AB
+
@uA
@tC
dtC
dAB
(47)
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The appendix shows that coordination in AB a¤ects tax rates asymmetrically:
dtA
dAB
=  2
3
@
@AB
=  2
3
nB
  w   kAB
2
@kAB
@AB
> 0 (48)
dtC
dAB
=
2
3
@
@AB
=
2
3
nB
  w   kAB
2
@kAB
@AB
< 0 (49)
Whereas countryA increases its tax rate in response to the coordinated increase
in AB, country C lowers its tax rate. This result can be explained as follows.
The increase in intra-union infrastructure expenditure makes country A a more
attractive location because access to the market of B is improved. Country C
becomes less attractive. This is why A increases its tax rate and C reduces it.
With @uA
@tC
=  @uA
@s
1

, it follows:
duA
dAB
=
@uA
@s
nB

  w   kAB
6
@kAB
@AB
> 0 (50)
which is unambiguously positive. Equivalently, we can derive duB
dAB
= @uB
@AB
+
@uB
@tA
dtA
dAB
+ @uB
@tC
dtC
dAB
with @uB
@tA
= @uB
@s
1

=  @uB
@tC
:
duB
dAB
=  
Z 1
s
 (s) ds+
2
3
nB

@uB
@s

(  w   kAB)
4
@kAB
@AB
(51)
which is positive as long as kBC is not too large in comparison to kAB, see
equation (45). We may summarize this in
Proposition 5 A coordinated increase in intra-union infrastructure expenditures
unambiguously increases the welfare of country A. If kAB is not too small compared
to kBC, then country B gains as well. Coordination increases the optimal tax rate
in country A and decreases the optimal tax rate in C.
Consider now the expenditures for infrastructure which links the union coun-
tries A and B to the peripheral country C. We analyze a small increase in ACA in
BCB with d
AC
A = d
BC
B = d
C . The appendix shows that this coordinated increase
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has the following e¤ects on tax rates:
dtA
dC
=  nC (  w   kAC)
4
@kAC
@ACA
+ nB
  w   kBC
6
@kBC
@BCB
(52)
and
dtC
dC
=  (  w   kAC)
4
@kAC
@ACA
  nB  w   kBC
6
@kBC
@BCB
(53)
The rst terms on the r.h.s. of (52) and (53) are positive and reect that the
gain in consumer surplus from attracting additional rms declines as transport
costs decline. This drives up tax rates. Secondly, the reduction in transport costs
between country B and country C makes country C more attractive as a location
for production, relative to A. As a result, C increases its tax rate and A reduces
it. This is captured by the second terms on the r.h.s. of (52) and (53).
Thus, the coordinated increase in union-periphery infrastructure investment
a¤ects the representative households utility in A by duA
dC
= @uA
@BCB
+ @uA
@tC
@tC
@C
or
duA
dC
=
@uA
@s
1


(  w   kAC)
4
@kAC
@ACA
  nB  w   kBC
3
@kBC
@BCB

(54)
The representative households utility in country A is a¤ected by the reduction
in transport cost between A and C, kAC , and by lower transport costs between B
and C, kBC . The former has a positive impact through higher tax rates in A. This
is captured by the rst term in square brackets. Lower levels of kBC , in contrast,
reduce the number of rms in country A. This is only partly compensated by
higher tax rates in C. Thus, the overall e¤ect is ambiguous, if both expenditure
levels, ACA and 
BC
B , are increased. If, however, the union countries agree on
increasing ACA and decreasing 
BC
B (or leaving 
BC
B una¤ected), the welfare e¤ect
on country A is positive.
Country B is a¤ected by the coordinated policies through reduced transport
costs for imported goods from country C and price changes due to rm relocation
between the competing countries: duB
dC
= @uB
@ACA
+ @uB
@tA
@tA
@C
+ @uB
@tC
@tC
@C
or
duB
dC
=
@uB
@s
1


(nC   1)   w   kAC
4
@kAC
@ACA
+ nB
  w   kBC
3
@kBC
@BCB

(55)
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If transport costs kAB and kBC are equal, then the coordinated increase does
not a¤ect the welfare in country B, which follows from (45). If these transport
costs di¤er, the change in welfare of country B is also ambiguous. This may be
summarized as
Proposition 6 A coordinated increase of investment in infrastructure which links
the union with the periphery has an ambiguous impact on both welfare and tax
rates.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
The analysis in this paper departs from the observation that the European Union
supports investment in infrastructure which reduces the cost of transport between
the member states. Our theoretical analysis has led to several results which require
some discussion.
Firstly, the model shows that the individual member countries do have incent-
ives to invest in infrastructure because this allows them to attract investment or
improves the access of local consumers to goods produced in other countries. How-
ever, the uncoordinated interaction of national tax and infrastructure policies will
lead to outcomes which are suboptimal for the union as a whole, as has already
been stressed by Fuest & Huber (2006) and Behrens et al. (2007), albeit in the
context of di¤erent models and for di¤erent reasons. In particular, national ex-
penditures on intra-union infrastructure are ine¢ ciently low in our model whereas
expenditures on infrastructure linking the union countries with the periphery are
too high. By increasing or decreasing the expenditure levels under consideration,
the union corrects for intra union spillovers of these policies.20
Secondly, and perhaps surprisingly, the reduction in mobility cost induced by
more infrastructure investment mitigates tax competition in our model. Thus,
the widespread view that tax competition is intensied as mobility costs decline
may have to be qualied. Most importantly, the type of mobility matters. In
20Keen & Marchand (1997) argue in a di¤erent framework that countries will tend to spend
too much on infrastructure and too little on public consumption goods. The di¤erence in results
is due to the fact that there are no direct spillovers from infrastructure provision in their model,
and tax rates are assumed to be held constant when infrastructure expenditure is coordinated.
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the model, di¤erent types of mobility are at play. The parameter kAB (as well as
kAC and kBC) denote mobility costs of goods, as opposed to the mobility costs of
rms. The latter is implicitly captured by the parameter . As indicated above,
 determines how elastically rms react to policy changes, e.g. @s=@tA = 1=.
Here, if  is large, tax rate changes only have a small e¤ect on s, i.e. the number
of rms leaving a country in response to a given tax increase is small. Of course,
a reduction in  has implications for tax competition.21 However, as this papers
focus is on regional policy directed at reducing trade costs, we do not analyze
the e¤ects of variations in  in greater detail. For a given level of rm mobility,
though, a decrease in transport costs mitigates tax competition.22 The reason is
that part of the cost of a tax increase - the reduction in consumer surplus due to
rm relocation - becomes smaller as transport costs decline.
Thirdly, the implication of coordinating infrastructure expenditures may be a
kind of fortress building policy. As the theoretical model shows, a coordinated
reduction in expenditures for infrastructure that links the union to non-union
countries may be welfare-increasing for the union. The non-union country would,
however, be negatively a¤ected by this type of coordination.
Fourthly, an overall conclusion from this analysis could be that certain types
of EU regional policies may be justiable from an economic point of view even
if they have no measurable e¤ect on growth or economic convergence. In our
model, a coordinated increase of intra-union infrastructure may be benecial for
both countries even though no (additional) rm locates there. The surplus of such
policy measures is due to lower prices and/or higher tax rates (depending on the
scenario). Taking into account the fortress building e¤ects of policy coordination
(see above), these benets may come at the cost of decreasing welfare in non-EU
countries, though.
21E.g., assuming symmetry, total di¤erentiation of (19) yields dtA=d = @uA@s
1
2 =
@2uA
@t2A
> 0,
which implies that a decline in rm mobility increases equilibrium tax rates, as one would expect.
22The idea that increasing mobility reduces tax competition is not completely new in the
literature. Kessler et al. (2002) show that, starting from a situation with integrated capital
markets, an increasing integration of labor markets across borders may mitigate corporate tax
competition.
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